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Consumer Learning and Brand Equity
STIJN M. J. VAN OSSELAER
JOSEPH W. ALBA*
A series of experiments illustrates a learning process that enhances brand equity
at the expense of quality-determining attributes. When the relationship between
brand name and product quality is learned prior to the relationship between product
attributes and quality, inhibition of the latter may occur. The phenomenon is shown
to be robust, but its influence appears sensitive to contextual variations in the
learning environment. Tests of process are inconsistent with attentional explana-
tions and popular models of causal reasoning, but they are supportive of associative
learning models that portray learners as inherently forward looking.
Purchase decisions are based on predictions of productperformance. Consumers base their predictions in part
on product cues and are accurate to the extent that they have
properly learned the relationship between the cues and
performance. Consumer research has devoted little attention
to this learning process despite its fundamental importance
(Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Meyer 1987). In the present
research we examine consumer learning of product cues as
predictors of product quality with particular emphasis on
the distinction between brand and attribute cues.
To illustrate, consider the cases in which consumers rely
strictly on either brand or attribute cues to predict quality.
If consumers learn the relationship between product
attributes and quality, they will differentiate among brands
that possess different attributes and treat as commodities
those brands that share the same attributes. Once the
predictive rule is learned, it may be applied to any new
brand that possesses the attributes. In contrast, consumers
who rely strictly on brand cues will ignore the underlying
attributes and may incorrectly differentiate physically
identical brands. The latter case is important because it can
be costly and is not uncommon (such as when consumers
pay high premiums for branded drugs that are chemically
identical to their generic counterparts). An appealing
explanation of this phenomenon is that consumers are
unaware of the attributes of these brands. Indeed, firms
attempt to foster such ignorance by making attribute
information difficult to find or process (Bergen, Dutta, and
Shugan 1996; Hoch and Deighton 1989). The present
research investigates whether consumers will routinely learn
the determinants of product quality when attribute cues are
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freely available and processing is unconstrained. We suggest
that learning can be suppressed even under these relatively
favorable conditions due to the learning phenomenon known
as blocking.
BLOCKING
As originally documented in the study of classical con-
ditioning, the learning of one predictive cue can “block” the
learning of subsequently encountered predictive cues. Spe-
cifically, once the relationship between a conditioned stim-
ulus (e.g., a tone) and an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., a
shock) is fully learned, consistent copresentation of a second
stimulus (e.g., a light) with the original conditioned and
unconditioned stimuli will fail to produce any evidence of
learning of the relationship between the second conditioned
stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus (Kamin 1969). That
is, the second stimulus evokes no response from the organ-
ism despite being perfectly predictive of the unconditioned
stimulus. Analogous effects have been reported in human
learning tasks (e.g., Dickinson, Shanks, and Evenden 1984;
Waldmann and Holyoak 1992).
This phenomenon is pertinent to consumer learning be-
cause consumers often do not encounter all predictive cues
simultaneously, and it is likely that exposure to brand cues
will precede exposure to information about the attributes
that truly determine quality. In such instances, consumer
learning mimics the blocking paradigm, with brands block-
ing the learning of attributes. Insofar as blocking is ob-
served, a previously unidentified source of brand equity is
uncovered.
The notion that brands may inhibit learning of attributes
may seem nonintuitive in light of the causal status of the
former. Brands signal quality by virtue of their correlation
with quality but brands do not “cause” quality. Brand names
are merely surrogates for the intrinsic attributes and pro-
cesses that truly determine quality. Consumers should treat
a brand name as a useful heuristic—or as proxy for quality-
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determining attributes—but should abandon it when heu-
ristic reasoning is inappropriate. Evidence of blocking, how-
ever, would demonstrate that a correlational cue can suppress
learning of a causal feature, even when the latter is available
and equally predictive of quality.
In the following experiments, we examine the possibility
of this outcome while also assessing the merits of two pop-
ular but competing theoretical explanations of the blocking
phenomenon. Consistent with its roots in animal condition-
ing, one view relies on associative learning processes.
Briefly, associative and connectionist theories hold that hu-
mans and animals predict outcomes based on associations
with cues (see, e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Shanks 1994;
Shanks, Medin, and Holyoak 1996; Young 1995). Co-oc-
currence of a cue and an outcome strengthens their asso-
ciation via a simple learning process. A critical assumption
is that no additional learning occurs once perfect prediction
is achieved. Thus, additional cues that later appear cotem-
poraneously with the original predictive cue gain no asso-
ciation strength. Colloquially, these additional cues are
merely redundant, lacking the ability to improve predicta-
bility and therefore lacking value to a system designed to
predict the environment.
In contrast, replication of the effect with human subjects
and meaningful stimuli has inspired a more cognitive or
logic-based explanation (e.g., Cheng 1997; Cheng and Nov-
ick 1992; Waldmann and Holyoak 1992). According to this
view, people assess predictiveness and causality through
normative causal-reasoning processes. Just like scientists,
people search for data that provide unconfounded contrasts
free of ceiling and floor effects. In the case of blocking, the
first cue associated with the outcome is unconfounded with
any other cue and therefore is likely to be viewed as causal
via normal reasoning processes. The second cue occurs only
in the presence of the first cue and therefore never uniquely
predicts the outcome. Thus, people should be agnostic about
its causal status. We examine the merits of these competing
views in more detail as our data become pertinent. Based
on our empirical outcomes, we also entertain a third
explanation.
We begin the research with an investigation of the basic
applicability of the blocking paradigm to consumer learning
and the role that prior beliefs may play in it. In experiment
1 (and throughout), the effect of preexposure to a predictive
cue on learning of subsequent predictive cues is examined.
To examine the relevance of the procedure to brand equity
as well as the generalizability of the effect to other contexts,
the cue to which subjects are preexposed is manipulated. In
some conditions, preexposure is to predictive brand names;
in other conditions, preexposure is to an equally predictive
intrinsic product attribute. The remaining experiments are
conducted within the context of predictive brand cues. Ex-
periment 2 examines the moderating effects of prior beliefs
by manipulating the a priori relationship between the sub-
sequently provided predictive cues and the to-be-predicted
outcome. Experiments 2a and 2b examine alternative ex-
planations for the results. Experiments 2b, 3, and 4 explore
the merits of currently competing models of the basic effect.
EXPERIMENT 1
The most basic goal of experiment 1 was to determine
whether the blocking effect can be replicated with product
features in a consumer context. The second and more im-
portant goal was to explore consumers’ causal beliefs about
brands versus attributes as determinants of product quality.
To the extent that brands are regarded as noncausal signs,
they should yield to predictive intrinsic attributes encoun-
tered later. We examine this prediction by manipulating the
initially encountered predictive cue. Some subjects first
learned that brand name was predictive of quality; other
subjects first learned that an attribute was predictive of qual-
ity. All subjects were then exposed to a second predictive
(attribute) cue. If brands are viewed as signals rather than
causes, subjects in the brand condition should exhibit less
blocking; that is, they should be more willing to treat the
subsequently learned cue as the true cause of quality.
In addition to the manipulation of the preexposed feature
(brand name vs. intrinsic attribute), the consumer learning
context used in experiment 1 differed from previous block-
ing experiments in at least two ways: (1) it employed a very
small number of preexposures (four), and (2) subjects did
not make an explicit outcome prediction (e.g., a quality
prediction) on each trial. Both differences made experiment
1 a more conservative and externally valid test of the block-
ing phenomenon than any study to date.
Method
Design and Subjects. The basic paradigm in experi-
ment 1 consisted of showing subjects a number of product
descriptions that included information about product fea-
tures as well as the overall quality level. Subjects in the
experimental conditions received two series of product pro-
files. In the first set, only one product cue was predictive
of quality. In the second set, a second predictive cue was
added. Following Waldmann and Holyoak (1992), we will
refer to the first predictive feature as the “Predictive” feature
and to the second predictive feature as the “Redundant”
feature. The Predictive feature referred to either brand name
or an intrinsic attribute and was manipulated between sub-
jects. The Redundant feature was always an intrinsic attrib-
ute. The control conditions differed from the experimental
cells only by the absence of the first set of profiles. Thus,
in the control conditions, subjects learned about both pre-
dictive cues simultaneously and were not preexposed to in-
formation about one cue.1 The basic experimental design in
experiment 1 was a 2 (experimental vs. control) # 2 (type
of Predictive feature: brand vs. attribute) completely ran-
1Note that the Redundant feature in the control conditions is not any
more or less “redundant” than the Predictive feature. In the control con-
ditions, both features are always presented together. Hence, they are in-
troduced simultaneously and appear equally often.
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FIGURE 1
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF STIMULI (EXPERIMENT 1, BRAND CONDITIONS)
NOTE.—In the attribute conditions, brand was replaced by an attribute label (frame, bow, steering system, or outer skin).
domized factorial design (see Fig. 1 for a schematic rep-
resentation of stimuli; see the Appendix for design sum-
maries of this and the following experiments). Forty
undergraduate subjects participated in experiment 1 in return
for extra course credit.
Stimuli. The stimuli are most easily described by con-
dition. Each of the four cells of the design involved slight
variations on the others. In the brand/control condition, sub-
jects were presented with 12 profiles of whitewater rafts.
Each profile described a particular whitewater raft, listing
its brand name (Hypalon or Riken), type of compartments
(airecell or closed-cell), type of hull (always polyurethane),
type of floor (tubular or I-beam), and its quality level (high
or low). Six of the rafts were high quality and six were low
quality. Two features, brand and floor, were perfectly pre-
dictive of quality. All high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon
brand name and had a tubular floor. All low-quality rafts
were Riken brand rafts and had an I-beam floor. The position
of the two predictive features in the product descriptions (at
the top of the list of features vs. at the bottom) was coun-
terbalanced between subjects. Thus, for half the subjects,
brand information was presented at the top of the profile
and floor information near the bottom; for the other half,
brand information was presented near the bottom and floor
information at the top. Hull and compartments were un-
predictive filler features. All high-quality rafts and all low-
quality rafts had a polyurethane hull. Half of the high-quality
rafts and half of the lower-quality rafts had airecell com-
partments. The other half of the high-quality rafts and the
other half of the lower-quality rafts had closed-cell com-
partments. Thus, hull was a “constant” filler feature that was
not predictive of quality, and compartments was a varying
but “uncorrelated” filler feature that was equally unpred-
ictive of quality. In sum, subjects in the brand/control con-
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dition were simultaneously exposed to information about
two predictive features, brand (Predictive feature) and floor
(Redundant feature).
Subjects in the brand/experimental condition were pre-
sented with the same 12 profiles but were first preexposed
to four extra profiles. In these four profiles, information was
given about brand name, compartments, hull, and quality
but not about the type of floor. Two of these additional rafts
were high quality and two were low quality. As in the sub-
sequent 12 trials, the high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon
brand name and the low-quality rafts were Riken brand rafts.
Compartments and hull again were not predictive. Thus, the
experimental group was identical to the control group with
the exception that it was preexposed to four profiles that
indicated a brand-quality association but were mute about
a floor-quality association.
Stimuli in the attribute/control and attribute/experimental
conditions differed from corresponding brand conditions
only in terms of the Predictive feature. Brand name was
replaced by an intrinsic attribute (frame, bow, steering sys-
tem, or outer skin). Thus, high-quality rafts had hypalon
frames, bows, steering systems, or outer skins and low-
quality rafts had riken frames, bows, steering systems, or
outer skins. Consequently, subjects in the attribute/control
condition were simultaneously exposed to information about
two predictive intrinsic attributes; subjects in the attribute/
experimental condition were preexposed to information
about one predictive attribute (frame, bow, steering system,
or outer skin) before receiving information about another
predictive attribute (floor). The four different attribute labels
(frame, bow, steering system, and outer skin) were coun-
terbalanced across subjects and used to enhance general-
izability beyond any specific attribute label.
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups of one to five
and were randomly assigned to conditions. Each subject was
seated in front of a personal computer shielded from other
subjects. Instructions and stimuli were presented via the
Micro Experimental Laboratory software system (Schneider
1988). Instructions informed subjects about the type of stim-
ulus information they would receive and requested that they
try to “learn how to predict the quality level of whitewater
rafts” and to “determine what really matters in whitewater
rafts.” Subjects then were sequentially presented with 16
(experimental conditions) or 12 (control conditions) profiles
of whitewater rafts. Presentation was self-paced. The profiles
in the experimental conditions were separated into two learn-
ing phases. Phase 1 contained the four preexposure profiles
that indicated a Predictive feature-quality association but
were mute about the floor-quality association. Phase 2 fol-
lowed phase 1 and contained 12 profiles with information
about both cues. Phases 1 and 2 were separated by at least
10 seconds. Subjects in the control conditions received only
the phase 2 stimuli.
Measures. Several dependent measures were collected
after phase 2. The primary dependent measure consisted of
eight additional profiles of rafts containing information
about all four product cues. The eight profiles were con-
structed as a 2 # 2 # 2 factorial combination of the two
levels of the Predictive cue, the Redundant cue (floor), and
the uncorrelated filler feature (compartments). The constant
filler feature (hull) was also added to each profile, as in the
stimulus profiles of the learning phase(s). For each of the
eight rafts, subjects indicated whether the quality level of
the raft was high or low.2
Results
To summarize briefly, results showed a strong blocking
effect on the Redundant feature that was not qualified by
the nature of the Predictive feature (brand vs. attribute).
Results also showed a positive effect of preexposure on the
value subjects placed on the Predictive feature. No statis-
tically significant effects were found of the Predictive and
Redundant features’ position in the list of features. Hence,
the data were collapsed across the levels of this counter-
balancing variable.
The results for the primary measure were analyzed using
different logistic regression models that each included the
levels of one of the two predictive features and the inde-
pendent variables. Because all hypotheses are at the level
of the feature dimension (e.g., “floor” instead of “tubular
floor”) the conceptual dependent variable is the difference
in evaluation between products that had one level of a fea-
ture and products that had the other level of the feature. For
example, to assess the value placed on the floor feature in
the brand/control cell, a “mean feature effect” (MFE) of
floor was computed by subtracting the percentage of I-beam
floors in that cell that were judged to be high quality (12.5
percent) from the percentage of profiles with a tubular floor
judged to be high quality (85 percent, leading to a mean
feature effect of floor of .850 2 .125 = .725). For practical
purposes, this mean feature effect can be interpreted as a
floor part-worth or a floor weight. Means for each condition
are provided in Table 1.
Statistical analyses revealed, unsurprisingly, that preex-
posure to a predictive cue raises its weight relative to a
control condition (asymptotic , ). These anal-t = 2.28 p ! .01
yses also revealed that this effect occurs equally strongly
for brand and attribute cues (asymptotic ) and thatt = 2.09
2In addition to the binary quality judgments, willingness-to-pay judg-
ments and predictiveness ratings were collected. For the willingness-to-
pay measure, subjects were presented with some additional four-feature
profiles. This time, the levels of both filler features were held constant.
Nine profiles were constructed as a 3 # 3 factorial combination of the
two levels of the Predictive cue and Redundant cue presented in the learning
phase(s) plus a not previously presented level (“ensolite” brand name,
steering system, bow, frame, or outer skin, and “batten” floor). Subjects
were asked to guess the price that they thought would be reasonable for
each raft. They were told that prices ranged from $1,500 to $2,500 with
an average of $2,000. For the predictiveness measure, subjects were asked
to rate each of the product dimensions (brand, steering, bow, frame, or
outer skin; compartments; hull; and floor) independently as to whether it
predicted the quality level of rafts. A 21-point scale ranging from 210
(definitely does not predict quality level) to 0 (don’t know) to 110 (def-
initely predicts quality level) was used.
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TABLE 1
MEAN FEATURE EFFECTS (EXPERIMENT 1)
Type of Predictive
feature/feature Control Experimental Difference
Brand:
Brand (P) .28 .69 .41
Floor (R) .73 .19 2.54
Attribute:
Attribute (P) .33 .73 .40
Floor (R) .48 .23 2.25
NOTE.—Abbreviations used are “P” for “Predictive feature” and “R” for “Re-
dundant feature.”
brand and attribute cues received similar weights overall
(asymptotic ). More important, such preexposure re-t = .48
sulted in a strong blocking effect. When subjects received
just four preexposures to one predictive (Predictive) cue
before being exposed to information about a second pre-
dictive (Redundant) feature, the second feature had a much
smaller effect on product evaluations ( ) thanMFE = .21
when subjects were exposed to both predictive features si-
multaneously ( ; asymptotic , ).MFE = .60 t = 23.51 p ! .001
Thus, blocking can be obtained in a consumer context using
a relatively conservative procedure.
Also important is the test of the causal beliefs hypothesis.
If brands are treated as signals rather than causes, the block-
ing effect should be smaller when the first predictive cue
refers to a brand than when it refers to an intrinsic attribute.
The data, however, do not support this hypothesis (asymp-
totic , ). The effect of the Redundant featuret = 1.39 p 1 .16
(floor) on quality judgments after preexposure was as small
when the first predictive cue referred to an intrinsic attribute
( ) as when it referred to brand name (MFE = .23 MFE =
; asymptotic ). The main effect of the type of.19 t = .19
Predictive feature (brand vs. intrinsic attribute) on the effect
of the equally predictive Redundant feature also was not
statistically significant (asymptotic , ).t = 21.62 p 1 .10
With regard to the issue of brand equity, the results in-
dicate that there was no tendency for subjects in the brand/
experimental condition to discard the brand once a predictive
attribute was encountered. In fact, the impact of the latter
was strongly suppressed. One might argue that the brand
retained its dominance over the Redundant attribute simply
because brands enjoy special status. However, results from
the brand/control condition do not support this explanation.
When the predictive brand and attribute cues were presented
simultaneously, subjects placed a much higher weight on
the attribute—consistent with the hypothesis that attributes
are viewed as more causal of quality than is a brand name.3
3Results from the other dependent measures were essentially identical
with those observed from the binary quality measure. These additional
measures are important because they refute an alternative explanation of
the blocking effect. The low weight placed on the Redundant feature (floor)
may have been caused not by a decrease in the perceived importance of
this feature but indirectly by an increase in the perceived importance of
the Predictive feature due to the four extra exposures to that feature in the
experimental conditions. Thus, it is possible that subjects did learn that
floors were important predictors of quality in whitewater rafts but did not
use this information because another, more accessible or diagnostic cue
(e.g., a known brand name) was present. This explanation is not consistent
with the strong blocking effect found on predictiveness ratings of the
Redundant feature only (i.e., independent of the Predictive feature; F(1,
36) = 7.31, ) and also is not consistent with the results of a separatep ! .02
analysis on the WTP judgments for profiles containing a new, unknown
level of the Predictive feature. In these cases, subjects should have relied
on what they learned about the Redundant feature (floor), because no other
diagnostic information was available. Results again revealed a significant
blocking effect (F(1, 36) = 5.71, ). In absolute dollar terms, the rawp ! .05
dollar premiums subjects were willing to pay for a tubular floor versus an
I-beam floor were three times larger in the control conditions than in the
experimental conditions. Thus, even in the absence of the preexposed Pre-
dictive cue, subjects in the experimental condition failed to place much
credence in the Redundant attribute.
Discussion
Experiment 1 suggests that providing consumers with in-
formation about a predictive intrinsic attribute does not nec-
essarily cause them to value the attribute at the expense of
the brand name. When subjects had experience with brand
names before they were exposed to equally predictive at-
tribute information, the attribute information gained little
predictive value, and a very strong brand preference was
observed. This strong brand preference and weak attribute
preference would be unsurprising if subjects accorded spe-
cial status to brand names. However, results in the control
conditions of this and following experiments are not con-
sistent with such an explanation. For example, the binary
quality judgments in the brand/control condition showed that
brand names retained little predictive value when subjects
learned about brands and attributes simultaneously. Thus,
subjects appeared sensitive to the causal status of quality
cues, and exposure to information about a predictive intrin-
sic attribute in this situation caused subjects to value the
attribute at the expense of the brand name.
The large differences observed between the brand/control
and brand/experimental conditions suggest that the blocking
phenomenon is robust with respect to consumers’ preex-
perimental beliefs about which features should be more or
less important for a particular consumption outcome. It is
also possible, however, that subjects’ general causal beliefs
about brands versus attributes were rather weak and that
stronger, more specific prior beliefs relating the Redundant
feature to the outcome would decrease the blocking effect.
Broniarczyk and Alba (1994) have shown that strong a priori
beliefs about product attributes can drive predictions of qual-
ity, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. Thus, a
stronger test of the blocking potential of a brand name would
be to use a Redundant attribute that is more explicitly related
to the outcome. In the next experiment we retain brand as
the Predictive cue and manipulate the conceptual relation-
ship between the Redundant feature and the outcome.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to explore the robustness of
the blocking phenomenon by increasing subjects’ oppor-
tunity to learn and understand the significance of the Re-
dundant intrinsic attribute after preexposure to brand infor-
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TABLE 2
MEAN FEATURE EFFECTS (EXPERIMENT 2)
A priori relatedness/
feature
Control Experimental Difference
12 24 All 12 24 All 12 24 All
Low (outcome: quality):
Brand (P) .31 .43 .36 .77 .75 .76 .46 .32 .39
Rudder (R) .69 .43 .57 .10 .14 .12 2.59 2.29 2.45
High (outcome: steering
performance):
Brand (P) .19 .21 .20 .41 .57 .49 .22 .36 .29
Rudder (R) .81 .71 .76 .38 .43 .40 2.43 2.28 2.36
NOTE.—“12” refers to conditions with 12 trials in phase 2. “24” refers to conditions with 24 trials in phase 2. “All” refers to results collapsed across “12” and “24”
conditions.
mation. This objective was accomplished in two ways. First,
we manipulated the conceptual relationship between the out-
come and the to-be-blocked Redundant attribute. Second,
we manipulated the number of exposures to the Redundant
attribute, doubling it from 12 to 24 exposures in half the
conditions.
Method
A total of 111 subjects participated in groups of one to
eight. The procedure and stimulus format for experiment 2
were similar to those used in experiment 1 with the follow-
ing exceptions. In all conditions, the Predictive feature re-
ferred to brand name (Hypalon or Riken) and the Redundant
feature was “rudder” (with fourcase as the positive level and
backbar as the negative level). To make the Redundant fea-
ture stand out further as an intrinsic attribute, the unpred-
ictive filler features in experiment 2 were extrinsic attributes
(warranty and country of origin).
For half the subjects (low priors conditions), the con-
sumption outcome information was information about the
raft’s general quality level (high quality vs. low quality), an
outcome with little particular relatedness to the Redundant
attribute (rudder). For subjects in the high priors conditions,
the outcome pertained to the steering quality of the rafts
(good steering performance versus bad steering perform-
ance). In these conditions, a very strong a priori relationship
should exist between the Redundant attribute (rudder) and
the consumption outcome (steering). At a minimum, this
manipulation should be a stronger manipulation of causal
beliefs than the brand-versus-attribute manipulation in ex-
periment 1, inasmuch as the type of rudder should have a
stronger and more direct causal influence on steering per-
formance than on overall quality.
The other major difference between experiments 1 and 2
was the manipulation of the number of product exposures
in the second learning phase. In the second learning phase,
half the subjects received 12 learning trials and the other
half received 24 learning trials. Thus, the basic design of
experiment 2 was a 2 (experimental vs. control) # 2 (num-
ber of phase 2 trials) # 2 (conceptual relatedness) com-
pletely randomized factorial design.
The primary dependent measure was a binary quality
measure equivalent to the one used in experiment 1.4
Results and Discussion
Overall, the blocking effect was robust with respect to
the conceptual relationship between the Redundant cue and
outcome as well as the number of exposures to the Redun-
dant cue–outcome relationship. Table 2 shows the mean
feature effects for the binary quality judgment measure. The
results for the effect of the Redundant feature (rudder)
showed a significant blocking effect of brand name preex-
posure on quality judgments (asymptotic ,t = 22.41 p !
). That is, rudder received a lower weight in the exper-.02
imental than control conditions. The analysis also yielded
a significant effect of the relatedness manipulation (asymp-
totic , ), indicating that subjects put moret = 22.46 p ! .05
weight on the rudder attribute when the outcome was steer-
ing performance than when the outcome was overall quality.
This effect can be interpreted as a successful manipulation
check on the relatedness manipulation. Interestingly, no sup-
port was found for the hypothesis that the blocking effect
would be moderated by specific prior beliefs (asymptotic
). In addition, this analysis yielded no significant ef-t = .47
fects of the number of trials (12 vs. 24) in phase 2 (all
).ps 1 .25
The results for the effect of brand (the Predictive feature)
on quality judgments generally mirrored the results for rud-
der (the Redundant feature). Just four preexposures to brand
information caused a large increase in the mean feature ef-
4In addition, a simplified willingness-to-pay measure was used in which
subjects were presented with three pairs of raft profiles. In each pair, one
of the rafts was a Riken brand raft that was made in Canada, with a one-
year warranty, a backbar rudder, and a price of $2,000. The second raft
was identical except that it had the alternative level of one of the features
(e.g., Hypalon brand, made in Canada, one-year warranty, backbar rudder)
and lacked a price. After being informed that prices on the market range
from $1,500 to $2,500, subjects were asked to indicate for each pair how
much more or less they were willing to pay for the second raft compared
to the first raft. Thus, subjects were asked to directly indicate the dollar
premium for a raft that differed from another raft by only one feature.
Results for the willingness-to-pay judgments showed the same statistical
pattern of results found with the binary quality judgments and will not be
discussed further.
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fect of brand (asymptotic , ). The preexpo-t = 2.79 p ! .01
sure effect did not interact with relatedness (asymptotic
) nor were there any other higher-order interactions.t = .36
No statistically significant effects were found of the manip-
ulation of the number of phase 2 trials (all ). Theps 1 .30
effect of the relatedness manipulation on the weight subjects
placed on brand names was not statistically significant (as-
ymptotic , ).t = 1.60 p 1 .10
An individual-level analysis of the data not surprisingly
revealed that a minority of subjects in the experimental con-
ditions failed to show blocking. Inasmuch as learning of the
brand-quality relationship in phase 1 is a prerequisite for
blocking, a follow-up study was conducted to assess the
degree of phase 1 learning. An independent group of 23
subjects experienced phase 1 only of the low priors/exper-
imental condition and then were asked to make binary qual-
ity judgments. Results showed that 74 percent of the subjects
based their judgments exclusively on brand name, indicating
learning of the brand-quality relationship. This figure cor-
responds almost precisely to the 73 percent of subjects in
the corresponding condition of the main experiment who
based their binary quality judgments exclusively on the
brand name at the end of phase 2. This result suggests that
blocking obtained for all subjects who initially learned the
brand-quality relationship and that any acquisition of value
by the Redundant attribute in the second learning phase by
subjects in the experimental condition was due to a lack of
learning in phase 1. In this sense, the results reported in the
preceding experiments are very conservative. It appears that
all subjects who learn the brand-quality relationship in phase
1 exhibit blocking.
EXPERIMENT 2A
The blocking effect found in experiments 1 and 2 could
be caused by several underlying processes. One explanation
is the “encoding account” (e.g., Price and Yates 1995). Ac-
cording to this account, subjects quickly learn which cue is
most predictive of an outcome and then direct most of their
attention to that cue. In a blocking context, this explanation
holds that learning about the Predictive cue in phase 1 causes
subjects to direct attention away from the Redundant cue
in phase 2. As a result, subjects do not encode the occur-
rences of the Redundant cue, cannot reproduce the pattern
of co-occurrence between that cue and the other cues or
outcome, and do not learn that it is predictive of the out-
come. Empirical support for the encoding account would
include evidence that consumers not only fail to search for
additional information once a sufficient cause or predictor
has been found (cf. Shaklee and Fischhoff 1982) but that
they even fail to attend to additional product features when
available.
Experiment 2a addressed the encoding account by asking
subjects in a standard two-phase blocking condition to recall
the pattern of co-occurrence of the Redundant feature and
the outcome, in addition to making binary quality judg-
ments. The encoding account predicts a negative relationship
between blocking and ability to recall the pattern of co-
occurrence between the Redundant feature and quality. Fur-
ther, because the encoding account holds that attention to
one cue leads consumers to turn attention away from sub-
sequently encountered cues, the encoding account also pre-
dicts a negative relationship between consumers’ ability to
recall the pattern of co-occurrence between the Predictive
feature and quality and their ability to recall the pattern of
co-occurrence between the Redundant feature and quality.
Method
Fifty-two subjects received a treatment similar to the 12
trials/low priors/experimental cell of experiment 2. The only
difference was that in addition to the eight binary quality
judgments, subjects estimated the co-occurrence between
product features and quality. The two tasks were counter-
balanced. The syntax of the co-occurrence questions was:
“In the second set of rafts, how many of the (high/low)
quality rafts had a (level feature)?” Responses were taken
on a five-point scale anchored by 0 percent (None, all [high/
low] quality rafts had an [other level feature]) and 100 per-
cent (All [high/low] quality rafts had a [level feature]). The
scale points were multiples of 25 percent.
Results and Discussion
Co-occurrence perceptions between the Redundant fea-
ture (rudder) and quality were computed by subtracting the
perceived percentage of the high-quality rafts that had a
fourcase rudder from the perceived percentage of the low-
quality rafts that had a fourcase rudder. Subjects’ co-oc-
currence perceptions were classified into three categories.
If subjects correctly identified that 100 percent of the high-
quality rafts had a fourcase rudder and that 0 percent of the
low-quality rafts had a fourcase rudder, they were classified
as “fully accurate.” Subjects who merely identified a higher
percentage of fourcase rudders for high-quality rafts than
for low-quality rafts were classified as “partially accurate.”
Subjects claiming that the rudder in the co-occurrence ques-
tion was equally often paired with high quality as with low
quality were classified as “inaccurate.” The latter category
also was used for subjects indicating a lower percentage of
fourcase rudders for high-quality rafts than for low-quality
rafts.
Results for the two dependent measures (quality and co-
occurrence judgments) were first tested for order effects.
These analyses showed no effect of order on co-occurrence
judgments (asymptotic ), but they did show a dif-t = .51
ference in the number of subjects displaying a “blocked”
pattern of quality judgments when those judgments were
made after having judged co-occurrence (asymptotic t =
, ).5 We therefore concentrate our discussion21.81 p = .07
on the group that made quality judgments prior to co-oc-
currence judgments.
Table 3 shows that of the 19 subjects demonstrating an
5One of the subjects failed to answer some of the dependent measures.
Therefore, most analyses relied on answers from 51 instead of 52 subjects.
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TABLE 3
FREQUENCIES (PROPORTIONS) OF SUBJECTS SHOWING QUALITY AND CO-OCCURRENCE JUDGMENT PATTERNS
(EXPERIMENT 2A)
Order/quality judgments
depending on
Co-occurrence judgments
Fully accurate Partially accurate Inaccurate All
Quality first:
Brand 9 (.47) 6 (.32) 4 (.21) 19 (1.00)
Other 1 (.14) 1 (.14) 5 (.71) 7 (1.00)
All 10 (.38) 7 (.27) 9 (.35) 26 (1.00)
Co-occurrence first:
Brand 3 (.25) 4 (.33) 5 (.42) 12 (1.00)
Other 7 (.54) 4 (.31) 2 (.15) 13 (1.00)
All 10 (.40) 8 (.32) 7 (.28) 25 (1.00)
NOTE.—Not all proportions add up to 1.00 due to rounding after the second digit.
entirely brand-driven pattern of quality judgments, 15
showed at least partially accurate perceptions of the co-
occurrence between the Redundant attribute and quality. Of
these 15, nine were fully accurate. Logistic regression anal-
yses showed that entirely brand-driven subjects were sig-
nificantly more likely than not to have at least partially
accurate memory for the co-occurrence of the Redundant
cue and quality level (asymptotic , ).t = 2.35 p ! .02
Logistic regression analyses also showed that entirely
brand-driven subjects were significantly more likely to show
at least partially accurate co-occurrence recall than subjects
whose quality judgments were not entirely brand driven
(asymptotic , ). Thus, evidence was foundt = 2.24 p ! .03
against a negative relationship between placing a low weight
on rudder information (as evidenced by a “blocked” pattern
of quality judgments) and ability to recall the pattern of co-
occurrence between different types of rudders and quality.
Finally, contrary to the encoding explanation, a correlational
analysis of the rudder-quality and brand-quality co-occur-
rence judgments did not yield a negative correlation between
the accuracy of co-occurrence judgments for brand and rud-
der ( ). Together, the data do not support an attentionalr = .15
explanation of the blocking effect. That is, blocking of the
Redundant attribute obtains even when its relationship to
the outcome is soundly encoded. Of course, failures to attend
to the Redundant attribute surely occur in the world and
provide another avenue to the blocking effect. Experiment
2a demonstrates, however, that encoding failure is not a
necessary condition.
Finally, we should note that blocking was weaker among
subjects who estimated the co-occurrence of the Redundant
cue and the outcome prior to making quality judgments.
Although such an outcome is consistent with a “demand”
to be consistent across responses, it is also possible that
blocking is reduced when the Redundant cue’s relationship
with the outcome is made salient and consumers are com-
pelled to consider its implications.
EXPERIMENT 2B
As noted, cognitive explanations of blocking are based
on normative causal reasoning about the presence and ab-
sence of specific cues and outcomes. In terms of a previous
example, the Predictive cue (tone) varies independently (and
in the absence) of the second predictive cue (light) during
phase 1. Because the tone is always followed by the outcome
(shock) and the tone is unconfounded with the light, nor-
mative causal reasoning should lead to the conclusion that
the tone causes shock. For the Redundant cue (light), the
only unconfounded contrast is provided by comparing the
“light present, tone present” situation with the “light absent,
tone present” situation. Because the shock always appears
in the “light absent, tone present” situation, any “light effect”
is masked by a ceiling effect. Thus, subjects should conclude
that the Predictive cue has a strong effect on the outcome
but that the role of the Redundant feature is indeterminate
(Cheng 1997).
Although results from the experimental groups in exper-
iments 1 and 2 conform to these predictions, results from
the control conditions do not. In the control conditions, the
Predictive and Redundant cues were completely con-
founded. Thus, subjects should have been just as agnostic
about their influence on the outcome as they were about the
Redundant feature’s influence in the experimental condi-
tions. Our findings are clearly inconsistent with this pre-
diction.6 Experiment 2b was designed to assess another as-
pect of the cognitive account and to address an important
concern regarding the generalizability of the blocking effect.
According to the causal reasoning view, people retro-
spectively access their memory of specific stimuli, code and
summarize the stimuli, and then perform the normative anal-
ysis that produces their assessments of causality and pre-
dictiveness. The normative causal reasoning explanation of
the blocking effect depends on specific assumptions about
the retrospective coding of events that took place in the first
learning phase. Consider again the classic demonstration. In
Kamin’s (1969) experiment, the status of the Redundant cue
(light) in phase 1 was clear. It was not on. Also, the status
of that cue in phase 1 was the same as in trials in which
6For example, the average predictiveness rating for the Redundant feature
in the control condition of experiment 1 did not indicate agnosticity (8.60
on a scale ranging from 210 [definitely does not predict quality level] to
0 [don’t know] to 110 [definitely predicts quality level]) and was signif-
icantly higher than the average rating in the experimental condition (4.80).
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the outcome (shock) did not occur in phase 2. It was not
on. Thus, the appropriate conditional contrast could be com-
puted for the Predictive cue (tone) in phase 1, but not for
the Redundant cue (light). In Kamin’s experiment it can be
assumed that subjects normatively code the first phase trials
as “Redundant cue absent.” However, in experiments 1 and
2, floors or rudders were not absent or present in phase 2
but, like many product features, were present in two different
forms. The coding issue in the case of such features is more
complex. A normative causal reasoning account predicts that
a subject who received information in the second learning
phase showing that rafts had either a tubular floor or an I-
beam floor would be uncertain about the floors possessed
by the rafts in phase 1. If so, subjects should be uncertain
about the causal status of the first predictive feature (e.g.,
brand) because it is now potentially confounded with the
second predictive feature (e.g., floor). Our data, however,
show little sign of uncertainty about the Predictive feature
in the experimental conditions.
Although intuitively unlikely, it is also possible that sub-
jects inferred that the brands in phase 1 either did not have
any level of the Redundant feature or had levels different
from the levels in phase 2. If so, causal reasoning models
could still make the same predictions as in the classic case
in which the Redundant feature is clearly absent in phase
1. This raises the possibility that the blocking effect is de-
pendent on particular inferences about missing information.
It also suggests that blocking should not occur in the com-
mon situation in which consumers naturally assume that the
products they received information about first were the same
as the ones they received more detailed information about
later. (For example, it is unlikely that consumers assume
that the Tylenol headache medicine they saw advertised on
TV had different ingredients than the Tylenol found at the
store.) When consumers appropriately infer that brands have
the same attributes during the first learning phase as during
the second learning phase, brand and the Redundant attribute
are equally confounded in both phases and no preexposure
effects should obtain. Thus, a stronger test of both external
validity and the causal reasoning hypothesis involves the
situation in which there is no uncertainty about the implicit
status of the Redundant feature in phase 1 learning trials.
Method
Sixty-eight subjects, in groups of one to six persons, par-
ticipated in a two-group design. In the control condition,
subjects were presented with 12 profiles of whitewater rafts
that were purportedly taken from a catalog. As in previous
experiments, these profiles contained two product cues
(brand and floor) that were predictive of quality as well as
two unpredictive intrinsic filler features (rudder and fabric).
In the experimental condition, subjects received the same
12 profiles but were preexposed to 12 other profiles. As in
previous experiments, these phase 1 profiles contained in-
formation about quality, brand, and two filler features but
were mute about floors. Brand was again predictive of qual-
ity, and the filler features were not. However, unlike in the
previous experiments, the phase 1 profiles were said to come
from a different catalog than those in phase 2. In addition,
the phase 1 profiles contained extrinsic filler features (coun-
try of origin and warranty) that were different from the
intrinsic filler features used in phase 2.
In the answer booklet, subjects in both conditions received
additional information about whitewater rafts as part of the
introduction to the dependent measure. Embedded in this
information were statements saying that because whitewater
rafts have many different features, most catalogs can only
provide part of the information and that different catalogs
might offer the same products but provide information about
different types of features. A sentence was then inserted for
the experimental group saying that the rafts they saw in the
first catalog were exactly the same as those they saw in the
second catalog. These instructions effectively eliminated any
ambiguity about the status of the (implicit) Redundant cue
in phase 1 trials. The manipulation was inserted at the time
of test (instead of earlier) to maximize its temporal proximity
to the retrospective coding process that should take place
at test.
Following this introduction, subjects made binary quality
judgments. All eight measurement profiles contained the
intrinsic filler features; no mention was made of the extrinsic
filler features used in the first learning phase. Finally, sub-
jects in the experimental group responded to a question
designed to check whether they had read and attended to
the critical part of the instruction saying that the rafts in the
two learning phases were the same.
In sum, the main difference between experiment 2b and
the previous experiments was that subjects in the experi-
mental condition were explicitly told that the products in
phase 1 and phase 2 were the same. Thus, the two predictive
features were totally confounded in both phases for these
subjects. According to the causal reasoning hypothesis, no
blocking should occur.
Results and Discussion
The binary quality judgments showed effects of brand
preexposure on the mean feature effects of brand
( , ; asymptotic ,MFE = .41 MFE = .63 t = 3.00control experimental
) and floor ( , ; as-p ! .01 MFE = .56 MFE = .37control experimental
ymptotic , ). Of the 34 subjects in the ex-t = 22.51 p ! .02
perimental group, only four did not correctly remember the
“same rafts” instruction. Excluding these subjects from the
analysis did not change the results (asymptotic ,t = 2.99
for brand, and asymptotic , forp ! .01 t = 22.56 p ! .02
floor). The results do not support the normative causal rea-
soning account of blocking. A significant blocking effect
was found despite explicit instructions that the products in
the two learning phases were identical.
The present experiment provides another conservative test
of the blocking effect. The explicit realization that infor-
mation was missing should have caused subjects to be more
uncertain about their judgments, which, in turn, should have
led to more equal weighting of the Predictive and Redundant
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cues in both conditions. To the contrary, a strong blocking
effect was again observed.
Taken together, experiments 1–2b demonstrate a robust
blocking effect in a consumer context. Moreover, the effect
cannot be attributed to relatively uninteresting factors, such
as lack of attention to critical stimuli or idiosyncratic in-
ferences about implicit information. From a theoretical per-
spective, our results are inconsistent with a normative causal
reasoning explanation that requires retrospective consider-
ation of brand-related experiences. Rather, subjects appear
to engage in a forward-looking process aimed at establishing
accurate prediction of future outcomes, with little impor-
tance accorded to information that does not help to improve
prediction. The findings are consistent with associative or
connectionist explanations of blocking (e.g., Kruschke 1996;
Pearce 1994; Rescorla and Wagner 1972). In the remaining
experiments we broaden the investigation to other realistic
scenarios in an attempt to examine moderating conditions.
To our knowledge, these scenarios have not been examined
in prior research. Thus, another primary objective of the
remaining experiments is to shed additional light on the
learning process.
EXPERIMENT 3
In experiments 1–2b, we have investigated only scenarios
in which consumers experience just one high- (low-) quality
brand prior to exposure to redundant attribute information.
Of course, consumers sometimes experience multiple high-
(low-) quality brands before receiving information about the
attribute that really drives product performance. For ex-
ample, consumers may first learn that two brands of pain
killers (e.g., Advil and Motrin) work well before they learn
that both contain ibuprofen. We investigated this scenario
in experiment 3.
Investigating the shared attribute scenario is important,
not just to test generalizability to a common consumer learn-
ing situation, but because it allows us to investigate the role
of parsimony in consumer learning. Note that in the previous
experiments, both the Predictive feature and the Redundant
feature provided equally parsimonious explanation of per-
formance. However, when multiple Predictive brands share
the same level of the Redundant attribute, the Redundant
attribute becomes the more parsimonious cue. It is possible
that consumers decide to attribute performance to the first
predictive cue only when it is at least equally as parsimo-
nious as predictive cues encountered later. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the learning system is aimed not at establishing
accurate prediction but at establishing the most parsimo-
nious accurate prediction. In that case, no blocking should
occur when consumers experience multiple brands that share
the same level of an attribute. In contrast to this prediction,
associative models predict that the Predictive cue should
still interfere with the acquisition of predictive value by the
Redundant attribute, even though this Redundant attribute
provides a more parsimonious explanation. As will be ex-
plained in more detail in the “General Discussion” section
below, simple associative models do predict a main effect
of parsimony. However, they could not account for a de-
crease in the effect of preexposure on the value of the Re-
dundant attribute as it becomes more parsimonious.
Method
Design. In experiment 3, we manipulated preexposure
(experimental vs. control) and the number of brand names
per attribute level (one vs. two) in a 2 # 2 completely
randomized factorial design.
Stimuli and Procedure. Eighty-two subjects partici-
pated in groups of one to six using a procedure identical to
that in the previous studies. In the one/control condition,
subjects received 16 profiles of whitewater rafts with in-
formation about quality, a Predictive feature (brand), a Re-
dundant feature (floor), a constant filler feature (warranty),
and a varying but unpredictive filler feature (country of
origin). Eight rafts were high quality, carried the Hypalon
brand name, and had a tubular floor. The eight remaining
rafts were low quality, carried the Riken brand name, and
had an I-beam floor. Thus, brand and Redundant attribute
information were learned simultaneously, and each level of
the Redundant attribute was coupled with just one brand
name. This condition was structurally identical to the basic
control conditions in the previous experiments. In the one/
experimental condition, subjects received the same 16 pro-
files but were preexposed to eight profiles. Four of these
phase 1 rafts were high quality and carried the Hypalon
brand name. The remaining four rafts were low quality and
carried the Riken brand name. The filler features were again
mentioned but unpredictive of quality, and no mention was
made of the Redundant attribute (floor). This condition was
structurally identical to the basic experimental conditions in
the previous experiments.
The two-brand conditions differed from the one-brand
conditions through the addition of a second brand at each
level of quality. In the two/control condition, subjects also
were exposed to 16 profiles of whitewater rafts. However,
instead of all eight high-quality rafts carrying the Hypalon
brand name, only four high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon
brand name. Four other high-quality rafts carried the Lea-
field brand name. All eight rafts had a tubular floor. Simi-
larly, only four low-quality rafts carried the Riken brand
name; the four remaining low-quality rafts carried the Bering
brand name. All eight of these rafts possessed an I-beam
floor. Thus, subjects learned simultaneously about brand
names and floor, and the number of exposures to each level
of the Redundant attribute was kept constant. However, each
level of the Redundant attribute was shared by two brand
names. Thus, floor type provided a more parsimonious “ex-
planation” of quality than the four brand names.
In the two/experimental condition, subjects received the
same 16 phase 2 profiles as subjects in the two/control con-
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TABLE 4
MEAN FEATURE EFFECTS (EXPERIMENT 3)
Number of brands
per attribute level/
feature Control Experimental Difference
One:
Brand (P) .30 .69 .39
Floor (R) .63 .29 2.34
Two:
Brand (P) .04 .34 .30
Floor (R) .93 .62 2.31
NOTE.—Brand effects are based on the two brand names (Hypalon and
Riken) that were present in both the one and two brands per attribute level
conditions. Brand effects including the two other brand names (Leafield and
Bering) in the two brands conditions were almost identical (.03 in the control
condition and .35 in the experimental condition).
dition but were preexposed to 16 profiles.7 Eight of these
profiles were the same profiles as the eight phase 1 profiles
in the one/experimental condition, that is, four high-quality
rafts carrying the Hypalon brand name and four low-quality
rafts carrying the Riken brand name. The eight remaining
profiles were four high-quality rafts carrying the Leafield
brand name and four low-quality rafts carrying the Bering
brand name.
Measure. The dependent measure consisted of the bi-
nary quality judgments used in the previous experiments.
In the conditions with one brand name per attribute level,
eight profiles were used that were constructed as a 2 # 2
# 2 factorial combination of brand (Hypalon vs. Riken),
floor (tubular vs. I-beam), and country of origin (Sweden
vs. Canada). In the conditions with two brand names per
attribute level, subjects made the same eight binary quality
judgments plus eight additional binary quality judgments
created by a 2 # 2 # 2 factorial combination of the second
pair of brands (Leafield vs. Riken), floor, and country of
origin.
Results and Discussion
As in the previous experiments, brand preexposure low-
ered the value subjects placed on the Redundant attribute
and increased the value they placed on brand name (as-
ymptotic , for the Redundant attribute;t = 23.38 p ! .001
and asymptotic , for brand name; see Tablet = 3.87 p ! .001
4). In addition, however, results supported the hypothesis
that subjects would place more value on a Redundant at-
tribute and less on brand name when the attribute is a more
parsimonious predictor of quality (asymptotic ,t = 3.79
for the Redundant attribute; asymptoticp ! .001 t = 2
, for brand name). Interaction effects between2.35 p ! .02
the parsimony manipulation and the preexposure manipu-
lation were not statistically significant (asymptotic t = 2
, for the Redundant attribute; asymptotic1.82 p 1 .05 t =
, for brand name). Thus, the results suggest21.22 p 1 .22
that a blocking effect occurs even when the Redundant at-
tribute is the more parsimonious predictor, as when con-
sumers experience multiple brands before receiving causal
attribute information. Consumers are sensitive to parsimony,
however.
The results reinforce the conclusion of experiment 2a that
our data are inconsistent with an attentional explanation.
Subjects exposed to predictive brand cues in phase 1 none-
theless placed a high weight on the Redundant cue en-
countered in phase 2. Clearly, subjects attended to the Re-
dundant attribute even after some learning of predictive
brand names.
More important, the results fail to refute a purely asso-
ciative account. Nonetheless, the two-brand experimental
7Two additional conditions were run to check for differences between
the experimental conditions in learning of the brand-quality relationships
in phase 1. The additional conditions were similar to the two experimental
conditions but omitted phase 2. Results for both conditions indicated im-
perfect but similar levels of learning of brand-quality relationships.
condition is the first instance in which we find a higher
weight being placed on the Redundant cue than the Predic-
tive cue—a result that is consistent with subjects’ preference
for a parsimonious account of product performance. In the
next experiment, we conduct a stronger test of the attrac-
tiveness of parsimony. Specifically, we examine the extent
to which subjects rely on a parsimonious brand cue when
retrospective processing is required to detect parsimony.
EXPERIMENT 4
The focal condition in the present experiment involved
pairing a predictive brand cue with a predictive attribute
cue in phase 1 (predictive extra attribute condition). In phase
2 the brand cue was paired with a different predictive at-
tribute. At the end of both phases, the high-quality brand
had been paired separately with two different predictive
attributes (and the low-quality brand had been paired with
the alternative levels of the same two attributes). Thus, par-
simony favors the brand as the causal cue.
Method
Procedure and Stimuli. Fifty-one subjects participated
in groups of one to six. Procedure and format of this ex-
periment were similar to those in the previous experiments.
In both of the two conditions in this experiment, subjects
were exposed to 24 profiles of whitewater rafts, divided over
two learning phases of 12 profiles each. Both conditions
involved the inclusion of an extra attribute in phase 1. The
extra attribute was either predictive or unpredictive of
quality.
In the first learning phase of the unpredictive extra at-
tribute condition, six high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon
brand name, were made either with polyurethane fabric in
Sweden or with neoprene fabric in Canada, and had a one-
year warranty. Six low-quality rafts carried the Riken brand
name, were also made either with polyurethane fabric in
Sweden or with neoprene fabric in Canada, and also had a
one-year warranty. Thus, as in earlier experiments, brand
was used as the Predictive feature; warranty and country of
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origin were used as constant and varying filler features,
respectively. Unlike in earlier experiments, an extra attrib-
ute, fabric, was added that was unpredictive of quality, ef-
fectively making it another varying filler feature. In phase
2, six high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon brand name
(Predictive feature), had tubular floors (Redundant feature),
had a one-year warranty (constant filler feature), and were
made either in Sweden or in Canada (varying filler feature).
Six low-quality rafts carried the Riken brand name, had I-
beam floors, and also had a one-year warranty and were
made in Sweden or Canada. The extra attribute from phase
1 (fabric) was not mentioned in the second learning phase.
In sum, the unpredictive extra attribute condition was struc-
turally the same as the standard experimental conditions in
the previous experiments.
The first learning phase in the predictive extra attribute
condition was identical to the first learning phase in the
unpredictive extra attribute condition, with the exception
that the extra attribute was now predictive of quality. Thus,
all six high-quality rafts carried the Hypalon brand name
and were made of polyurethane fabric. All six low-quality
rafts carried the Riken brand name and were made of ne-
oprene fabric. The phase 2 profiles were identical to those
in the unpredictive extra attribute condition.
Measures. The main dependent measure was the same
binary quality judgments measure used in the previous ex-
periments. In the binary quality judgments measure, no men-
tion was made of the extra feature. Two additional profiles
with a binary quality scale were included that had identical
levels of brand and the two filler features but differed in
their level of the extra feature.
Consistent with the results so far, subjects in the unpred-
ictive extra attribute condition should place a high weight
on the Predictive feature (brand) and very little weight on
the Redundant feature (floor). In the predictive extra attrib-
ute condition, the brand cue should again receive a high
weight if parsimony drives causal judgment. However, this
parsimony is not evident until phase 2 and requires subjects
to integrate across both phases. The relative importance of
parsimony versus retrospective processing should be re-
vealed by the relative weights placed on brand (Predictive
feature) versus floor (Redundant feature) in the predictive
extra attribute condition.
Results and Discussion
The unpredictive extra attribute condition exhibited the
expected blocking pattern ( , ).MFE = .35 MFE = .59floor brand
In contrast, subjects in the predictive extra attribute con-
dition placed more weight on a Redundant floor attribute
( ) than on Predictive brand names (MFE = .25).MFE = .58
This was true even though (1) subjects were exposed to
brand name information before being exposed to Redundant
attribute information and (2) brand names constituted a more
parsimonious explanation of quality than did attributes. In
addition, analyses showed that initial exposure to a predic-
tive extra attribute led subjects to place significantly more
value on the Redundant attribute and less value on brand
names than in the regular blocking scenario in which the
extra attribute was not predictive of quality (asymptotic
, for the Redundant attribute; asymptotict = 2.76 p ! .01
, for brand names). Of course, results int = 23.66 p ! .001
the separate two-profile measure showed that subjects placed
more value on the extra attribute when it was predictive
( ) than when it was not predictive ( )MFE = .82 MFE = .13
of quality (asymptotic , ).8t = 2.64 p ! .01
In sum, the results suggest that when parsimony requires
retrospective processing, the equity-preserving blocking ef-
fect observed repeatedly in the previous experiments may
not obtain. This surprising result raises two questions. The
first question is whether the reversal from experiment 3 is
due to the fact that brand name was the parsimonious cue
in experiment 4 or to the fact that the nonparsimonious cues
(the extra and Redundant attribute cues) were presented con-
secutively instead of simultaneously (which was the case
for the brand names in the two/control condition of exper-
iment 3). To address this question we ran a replication study
in which all cues were attributes (chemical ingredients of
eye drops). Results again showed a relatively high weight
on the Redundant feature. Although this weight was slightly
lower than the weight of the Predictive feature, the results
tentatively suggest that the effect of parsimony is limited
more by a lack of retrospective thought than by the nature
of the cues. Second, experiment 4 begs the question of pro-
cess. We address this issue below.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present series of experiments suggests that “blocking”
of consumer learning is a robust phenomenon that has im-
plications for brand equity. Strong blocking effects were
found despite a limited number of brand preexposures and
extensive exposure to predictive attribute information. In
addition, blocking effects were found even when attributes
were conceptually related to the benefit of interest, when
subjects had no reason to believe that the preexposed prod-
ucts were any different from the ones encountered later, and
when subjects experienced several brands sharing the same
attribute. Although the conceptual nature of product features
(brand vs. intrinsic attribute), a priori conceptual relatedness
between features and outcomes, and explanatory parsimony
did not significantly interact with the effect of brand preex-
posure, manipulations of these factors yielded strong main
effects. Finally, adding a predictive attribute at initial ex-
posure damaged brand equity and led to a dramatic reduction
of blocking of another predictive attribute encountered later.
The latter effect occurred despite the fact that brand name
was a more parsimonious predictor of performance than
were the attributes.
8Due to experimenter error, data for this measure were obtained from
only 46 of 51 subjects.
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Process
In terms of the psychological processes that might un-
derlie the blocking phenomenon, our results provide evi-
dence against explanations involving truncated processing
(experiments 2a and 4) or idiosyncratic inference making
(experiment 2b). More important, our results are inconsistent
with a currently prominent explanation that relies on nor-
mative causal reasoning processes. A central premise of the
causal reasoning explanation is that consumers retrospec-
tively retrieve instances of relevant experiences and perform
a causal analysis on those experiences. The data suggest,
however, that subjects did very little retrospective processing
in forming product evaluations.
The results are consistent, however, with theories that
view learning as a forward-looking process. Our data sug-
gest that evaluative learning is dominated by a satisficing
process aimed at establishing accurate prediction of future
consumption benefits. Such a process explains why little
value accrues to information that does not directly improve
prediction. The forward-looking property and the satisficing
property fit at least two more specific types of process ex-
planations: parallel associative updating and sequential hy-
pothesis testing.
Parallel Associative Updating. According to associ-
ative or connectionist theories, humans and animals predict
outcomes on the basis of associations with cues—with
stronger associations implying higher evaluative weights.
These theories hold that blocking and the other phenomena
found in our experiments are the result of the particular way
in which associations are updated. Associations between
many product cues and consumption outcomes are updated
simultaneously according to a learning rule that has a limited
set of fundamental properties. The first of these properties
is the property of “additivity,” which holds that the acti-
vation of an output node is an additive function of the as-
sociation strengths of all activated input cues. In a consumer-
learning context, this property holds that the predicted level
of a consumption outcome (e.g., quality) is an additive func-
tion of the strengths of its associations with all presented
product features. For example, if a brand and an attribute
both have positive quality associations, the predicted quality
of a product will be higher if it is known to possess both
the brand name and the attribute than if it possesses just
one of the two features. The second property is the property
of “error reduction,” which holds that the amount and di-
rection of the updating of an association’s strength depends
directly on the discrepancy between the actual activation of
an output node and the desired activation of an output node.
Larger discrepancies lead to larger changes in association
strength, and no updating takes place when the discrepancy
is zero. The result is that product features will gather as-
sociation strength only to the extent that predicted quality
levels are different from actual quality levels. Thus, if con-
sumers have learned to predict quality accurately on the
basis of brand associations formed during initial product
exposure, no further updating will take place. Attribute in-
formation provided after perfect prediction has been estab-
lished will not lead to an increase in or a loss of brand
association strength.
In addition to explaining the blocking phenomenon and
the effect of brand preexposure on brand equity, the asso-
ciative account can also explain the finding that the presence
of attribute information harms brand equity when brands
and attributes appear simultaneously. Note that, together, the
properties of additivity and error reduction imply that the
final sum of association strengths from copresent product
features is limited to the level of output activation at which
predicted and actual consumption outcomes are identical.
Thus, simultaneously presented brand and attribute cues
should develop associations with a consumption outcome
(e.g., quality), but the summed strength of those associations
will be limited to the same level as when only one predictive
cue is present. Thus, a brand’s association with quality is
lower when it is consistently presented with an attribute cue
than when it is presented alone. Brands and attributes may
be said to “compete” for equity.
By including a salience parameter, associative theories
can also account for the finding that consumers tend to place
more weight on attributes than on brands in simultaneous
learning conditions. This salience parameter reflects the fact
that some associations are learned faster and therefore ab-
sorb more of the limited available association strength than
other cues. In the same vein, more “parsimonious” cues
occur more often and therefore are updated more often than
less parsimonious cues that are learned simultaneously.
Thus, the more parsimonious cues should gain more of the
available association strength. A similar, but somewhat at-
tenuated process should occur when multiple brands fail to
establish perfectly strong associations before exposure to
more parsimonious attribute information (e.g., in the two/
experimental condition of experiment 3). Finally, associative
theories can account for the results in experiment 4, assum-
ing that, during initial learning, the less salient brand and
more salient attribute led the attribute information to out-
compete the brand information. The result would be a weak
association between brand and quality and a strong asso-
ciation between the attribute and quality. At the beginning
of phase 2, the attribute information was replaced by a new
predictive attribute. Output activation based on brand in-
formation alone would be low, leaving much opportunity
for the new attribute to establish a strong association to the
outcome.
Sequential Hypothesis Testing. Although parallel as-
sociative updating seems to fit our data surprisingly well,
we propose another forward-looking process that might ex-
plain how consumers learn to value product features. The
sequential hypothesis testing explanation holds that con-
sumers sequentially test product cues as potential expla-
nations of product performance. Moreover, hypothesis test-
ing ceases once a sufficient explanation has been found.
Such an explanation is consistent with related research
showing that people do not conduct an exhaustive search
for causal variables (Shaklee and Fischhoff 1982) and have
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difficulty entertaining more than one hypothesis at a time
(Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan 1993; Van Wallendael and
Hastie 1990).
The sequential hypothesis testing explanation explains the
basic blocking phenomenon because initial exposure to
brand information establishes a sufficient explanation of
product performance before attribute information can be
tested. This explanation also accounts for the “competition”
between cues found in the control conditions of experiments
1–3. In those situations, sufficient brand and attribute ex-
planations became available simultaneously. Assuming that
consumers favor testing attribute explanations before brand
explanations, most subjects should have tested the attribute
explanation first. Because the attribute information provided
a sufficient explanation of product performance, no testing
was done of the brand explanation. A similar account can
be applied to experiment 4, in which initial exposure was
to both a predictive attribute and a predictive brand. In this
case, subjects should test the attribute but not the brand
explanation. When the attribute explanation is no longer
viable (as in phase 2 of experiment 4), forward-looking
hypothesis testers should begin testing of a new attribute
explanation instead of the brand explanation. Thus, brands
should receive little evaluative weight despite being the most
parsimonious predictor of product performance across the
sequence of experiences. The hypothesis testing account can
also accommodate the parsimony effect in the two/experi-
mental condition of experiment 3 if one assumes that the
tendency to cease testing of additional explanations is re-
duced when the initial explanation is a multiple-sufficient
explanation instead of a singular-sufficient explanation.
Future Research
Distinguishing between the associative and hypothesis
testing processes is an important task for future research. In
particular, future research should focus on the essential dif-
ferences between the two theories in terms of sequential
versus parallel processing. Once a distinction is made be-
tween the two types of theories, further research should
address more detailed properties of the learning process.
Several associative models share the essential properties of
additivity and error reduction but differ in other important
aspects (e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Kruschke 1996;
Pearce 1994). Similarly, the sequential process may have
several additional properties and boundary conditions. To
generate and test predictions about such properties and con-
ditions, it would be beneficial to develop more formal pro-
cess models of evaluative learning involving sequential hy-
pothesis testing.
Future research also should examine the generalizability
and boundary conditions of the blocking phenomenon. In
particular, research should assess the sensitivity of the block-
ing phenomenon to “disconfirming evidence” about the
brand’s relationship to quality. Prior research on belief per-
severance suggests that disconfirming evidence does not
necessarily lead to a large change in attitude. However, dis-
confirming brand-quality experiences may reduce the
brand’s power to block attribute information from acquiring
predictive value.
Future research on blocking could also help identify con-
texts in which forward- and backward-looking processes are
more or less likely to play a role. For example, encouraging
consumers to recall specific instances may lead to quality
predictions that are less subject to blocking—as suggested
by experiment 2A. In addition, forward-looking, predictive
learning may be limited to characteristics that consumers
are motivated to learn. For example, predictive learning may
be less likely when consumers have less knowledge about
the product category or when category involvement is lower.
Consumers may also be more inclined to learn how to pre-
dict benefits than attributes. Thus, attribute learning may
have to be recalled retrospectively from an episodic memory
system that is not subject to blocking. The existence of an
episodic memory system, functioning in parallel with the
predictive memory system, also explains our finding in ex-
periment 2a that subjects were able to recall co-occurrence
frequencies between the Redundant attribute and quality de-
spite blocking of the attribute information in their predictive
quality judgments. Finally, consumers who are exposed only
to brand information may at some point decide to learn about
the causal impact of product attributes. Such consumers may
then “restart” the learning process while ignoring brand
names. Such a scenario would be tantamount to ignoring
phase 1 at the time of phase 2. Presumably, humans can
engage in hypothesis testing that is unconstrained by prior
associative learning.
More pragmatically, future research should examine other
instantiations of the blocking phenomenon. Brand equity is
a convenient but important context in which to study con-
sumer learning. As experiment 1 demonstrated, however,
the effect applies more broadly.
Conclusion
This research supplements our understanding of why con-
sumers value brand cues at the expense of attribute cues.
Our explanation is based on learning processes not previ-
ously investigated in consumer research. Stated simply,
brand cues may “block” the learning of quality-determining
attribute cues. Our findings also supplement research on the
blocking phenomenon by demonstrating its robustness in
the face of prior beliefs and the presence of more parsi-
monious predictors of quality. Moreover, we cast doubt on
explanations involving causal reasoning.
More generally, this research suggests an alternative ap-
proach to understanding product evaluation and choice. At
one level, we show that in order to understand the value
consumers place on product cues it is helpful to understand
how consumers learn. Our preliminary conclusion is that
learning is both forward looking and competitive in the
sense that cues compete against each other for predictive
value. We find little support for the notion that consumers
engage in causal analysis of retrospectively considered ex-
periences. At a broader level our evidence in favor of as-
sociative learning processes suggests that there are alter-
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native views of consumer behavior that do not invoke higher
level cognitive activity. This perspective has not been prom-
inent in consumer research but seems to be reemerging as
a credible approach to understanding human behavior (see
Alba, in press; Janiszewski and van Osselaer, in press).
APPENDIX
DESIGN SUMMARIES
TABLE A1
EXPERIMENT 1
Type of Predictive
feature/experimental vs.
control
Phase in experiment
Learning 1 Learning 2 Test
Brand:
Experimental Pbr11 Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr22 Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Control Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Attribute:
Experimental Pat11 Pat1Rat11 Pat?
Pat22 Pat2Rat22 Rat?
Control Pat1Rat11 Pat?
Pat2Rat22 Rat?
NOTE.—P = Predictive feature, R = Redundant feature, br = brand, at =
attribute, 1 = high quality, and 2 = low quality. Subscripts 1 and 2 refer to
different levels of a feature.
TABLE A2
EXPERIMENT 2
A priori relatedness/
experimental vs.
control
Phase in experiment
Learning 1 Learning 2 Test
Low:
Experimental Pbr11lp Pbr1Rat11lp Pbr?
Pbr22lp Pbr2Rat22lp Rat?
Control Pbr1Rat11lp Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22lp Rat?
High:
Experimental Pbr11hp Pbr1Rat11hp Pbr?
Pbr22hp Pbr2Rat22hp Rat?
Control Pbr1Rat11hp Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22hp Rat?
NOTE.—1lp = positive outcome, unrelated to the Redundant attribute; 2lp =
negative outcome, unrelated to the Redundant attribute; 1hp = positive out-
come, related to the Redundant attribute; and 2hp = negative outcome, related
to the Redundant attribute. Half the subjects received 12 trials and the other
half of the subjects received 24 trials in learning phase 2.
TABLE A3
EXPERIMENT 2B
Experimental
vs. control
Phase in experiment
Learning 1 Learning 2 Test
Experimental Pbr1Rat11 Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22 Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Control Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
NOTE.—Values of the Redundant feature (R) in learning phase 1 were ma-
nipulated via instructions in the test phase.
TABLE A4
EXPERIMENT 3
Number of
brands per
attribute level
Phase in experiment
Learning 1 Learning 2 Test
One:
Experimental Pbr11 Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr22 Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Control Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Two:
Experimental Pbr11 Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr22 Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Pbr31 Pbr3Rat11
Pbr42 Pbr4Rat22
Control Pbr1Rat11 Pbr?
Pbr2Rat22 Rat?
Pbr3Rat11
Pbr4Rat22
TABLE A5
EXPERIMENT 4
Type of extra
phase 1 attribute
(X)
Phase in experiment
Learning 1 Learning 2 Test
Unpredictive Pbr1X11 Pbr1Rat11 P?
Pbr2X12 Pbr2Rat22 R?
Pbr1X21
Pbr2X2-
Predictive Pbr1X11 Pbr1Rat11 P?
Pbr2X2- Pbr2Rat2- R?
NOTE.—“X” refers to the “extra attribute.”
[Received December 1998. Revised December 1999. Rob-
ert E. Burnkrant served as editor, and Barbara Loken
served as associate editor for this article.]
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